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MAJOR ARTICLE

Risk Assessment for Healthcare Workers After a
Sentinel Case of Rabies and Review of the
Literature
Virginia L. Kan,1,4 Patrick Joyce,2 Debra Benator,1,4 Kathleen Agnes,3 Janet Gill,3 Monica Irmler,3 Arlene Clark,3
George Giannakos,2 Audrey Gabourel,2 and Fred M. Gordin1,4
1

Infectious Diseases Section, 2Occupational Health, 3Infection Control, Veterans Affairs Medical Center, and 4George Washington University, Washington,
District of Columbia
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Background. After a case of rabies, healthcare workers (HCWs) had fear of contagion from the infected patient.
Although transmission of rabies to HCWs has never been documented, high-risk exposures theoretically include
direct contact of broken skin and/or mucosa with saliva, tears, oropharyngeal secretions, cerebrospinal ﬂuid, and
neural tissue. Urine/kidney exposure posed a concern, as our patient’s renal transplant was identiﬁed as the infection
source.
Methods. Our risk assessment included (1) identiﬁcation of exposed HCWs; (2) notiﬁcation of HCWs; (3) risk
assessment using a tool from the local health department; (4) supplemental screening for urine/kidney exposure; and
(5) postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) when indicated.
Results. A total of 222 HCWs including diverse hospital staff and medical trainees from university afﬁliates were
evaluated. Risk screening was initiated within 2 hours of rabies conﬁrmation, and 95% of HCWs were assessed within the ﬁrst 8 days. There were 8 high-risk exposures related to broken skin contact or mucosal splash with the patient’s secretions, and 1 person without high-risk contact sought and received PEP outside our hospital. Nine HCWs
(4%) received PEP with good tolerance. Due to fear of rabies transmission, additional HCWs without direct patient
contact required counseling. There have been no secondary cases after our sentinel rabies patient.
Conclusions. Rabies exposure represents a major concern for HCWs and requires rapid, comprehensive risk
screening and counseling of staff and timely PEP. Given the lack of human-to-human rabies transmission from
our own experience and the literature, a conservative approach seems appropriate for providing PEP to HCWs.
rabies exposure; healthcare worker; risk assessment; rabies postexposure prophylaxis.

Rabies is extremely rare in the United States, with an
estimated rate of 1–5 cases per year, and virtually always
leads to fatal human infection [1]. A renal transplant
recipient who was hospitalized for 23 days on our medical and intensive care units had antemortem serum
and tissue results that were suspicious for rabies; this
was conﬁrmed from postmortem brain examination
[2]. An extensive investigation led to the subsequent
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discovery that the transplant donor was the source of
our sentinel patient’s rabies infection and allowed for
successful rabies prophylaxis for the remaining 3 transplant recipients [2].
On the basis of a 1912 report, the risk of animalto-human transmission has been estimated at 0.1%
from open wound or mucous membrane contact with
saliva from rabid wolves, dogs, or cats in persons who
did not receive any preventive measures [3]. Fomite
transmission of rabies has not been reported [4]. Unusual nonbite transmission routes leading to human
infections from rabies have included contamination of
mucous membranes, aerosol exposure from spelunking
or laboratory activities, transplanted organs, and improperly inactivated vaccines [5, 6]. There has been no
documented human-to-human transmission of rabies,
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and only a single anecdotal report of transmission from a child
to his mother in Ethiopia [7].
Transmission of rabies has been documented in cases of
organ and/or tissue transplant [8]. Similar to our case, there
have been 2 other reports of rabies transmission to multiple
solid organ transplant recipients from single undiagnosed donors in the United States [9] and Germany [10]. However,
there has been no reported transmission to healthcare workers
(HCWs) during their care of patients with rabies [11]. Theoretically, high-risk exposures to HCWs include broken skin and/or
mucosal contact with saliva, tears, respiratory secretions, cerebrospinal ﬂuid, and neural tissue from a patient with rabies
[12–14]. We describe our risk assessment and postexposure
prophylaxis (PEP) for HCWs, and provide a comprehensive review of the literature, after a sentinel case of rabies was diagnosed at our teaching hospital.

Plans for our risk assessment were developed in collaboration
with the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
(MDHMH) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) after conﬁrmation of rabies in our patient and the
discovery of the renal transplant as the source of his infection.
Our assessment program included 5 steps: (1) identiﬁcation of
potentially exposed HCWs; (2) prompt notiﬁcation of these
HCWs; (3) risk assessment by staff from infection control, infectious diseases, or occupational health using an instrument
provided by the MDHMH (Supplementary Data 1); (4) supplemental assessment for urine and/or kidney tissue exposure
(Supplementary Data 2) before CDC guidance was given; and
(5) PEP given by occupational health when indicated.
The period of potential transmission was 14 days prior to our
patient’s onset of symptoms to the time of his death. We used
our electronic medical record to identify HCWs from different
services who documented care for our sentinel patient during
his outpatient visits and hospitalization on the medical ward
and medical intensive care unit. During his hospitalization,
the patient was on standard precautions. Staff from dietary
service, facility management, and pharmacy working in these
clinical areas were also considered for potential exposure. We
also used information during our screening interviews to identify additional HCWs on work teams who were not documented
in our electronic medical record.
Immediately after conﬁrmation of rabies in our sentinel patient on a Friday afternoon, all hospital department chiefs were
advised to notify their employees to report for risk assessments.
As our teaching hospital is also staffed by trainees from 4 afﬁliated universities, the 4 academic program directors were advised to send all trainees who may have been exposed to our
patient during their rotations at our medical center to our rabies
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RESULTS
Our medical center is a tertiary care teaching hospital with
trainees from 4 local universities in the greater metropolitan
area of Washington, District of Columbia. These trainees
from our 4 academic afﬁliates include third- and fourth-year
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METHODS

risk screening clinic. Our rabies risk screening clinic was
promptly organized and began to interview staff within 2
hours of rabies conﬁrmation on Friday afternoon. This risk
screening clinic was staffed by 4 infection control nurses and
2 infectious diseases senior staff physicians to interview and
counsel exposed HCWs. Using the risk assessment instrument
provided by the MDHMH (Supplementary Data 1), speciﬁc
high-risk rabies exposures included direct contact with our patient’s saliva, respiratory secretions, tears, cerebrospinal ﬂuid,
or laboratory specimens without personal protective equipment. Our rabies screening clinic was held for 8 consecutive
days from 7 AM to 5 PM to accommodate all work tours. Remaining HCWs who did not come to the screening clinic during
these ﬁrst 8 days were contacted in person or by telephone
for risk assessment by infectious diseases staff physicians.
When information emerged that the source of our sentinel
patient’s rabies was his renal transplant [2], urine and kidney
tissue exposures posed additional concerns, as both urine [15]
and kidney [9] have been known to harbor rabies antigen and
virus. We identiﬁed HCWs at potential risk to be from the nursing, laboratory, interventional radiology, and nephrology services. Prior to receiving ofﬁcial guidance from the CDC regarding
the transmission risk from urine and kidney tissue, we developed our own risk assessment instrument and implemented
supplemental screening for urine and/or kidney tissue exposure
(Supplementary Data 2).
Persons identiﬁed as having high-risk exposure(s) or concerns for transmission risks were referred to the occupational
health clinic. Speciﬁc risks were readdressed with these HCWs.
PEP was recommended to those with high-risk exposures and
given at this medical center using rabies immune globulin
and rabies vaccine on day 0, and further doses of rabies vaccine
on days 3, 7, and 14 for persons not previously vaccinated and
days 0 and 3 for persons previously vaccinated [16]. PEP was
not recommended to those who were not at high risk. Additional extensive counseling was provided to HCWs who had fear of
rabies transmission.
A literature review for 1978 through 2013 was conducted on
PubMed using the terms “rabies” and “healthcare workers” or
“hospital” or “prophylaxis” or “postexposure prophylaxis.” Additional searches for and veriﬁcation of rabies cases were made
using the CDC human rabies surveillance website at http://
www.cdc.gov/rabies/location/usa/surveillance/human_rabies.
html.

Table 1. Number of Risk Assessments, Supplemental Urine/
Kidney Exposure Risk, and Postexposure Prophylaxis for Healthcare
Workers, by Hospital Department

Table 2. Summary of Staff Time for Risk Assessment After a
Sentinel Case of Rabies
Service

Hospital Department
Chaplain
Dietary
Emergency department (total)

Risk
Assessment

Urine/
Kidney Risk

PEP
Given

6
4

0
0

0
0

6

3

0

Administrator
Health technician

1
1

Physicians

4

3

4
9

0
6

Facility management
Laboratory (total)

6

3

1
2

1
2

55

6

Staff physicians
Subspecialty fellows

19
9

3
2

Residents

19

Medical (total)

Infectious
diseases

0
0

Maintain records and
documentation

5

Participate in rabies
teleconferences

4
4

1
3a

Medical students

6

1b
1

Outpatient clinics

12

9

Medical ward
Intensive care unit

62
12

52
9

1

2

0

0

15
13

5
3

0

1

1

1

1

Interventional radiology
nurse
Interventional radiologist
Respiratory therapy
Social work
Surgery (total)

10

0

0

1
4

0
0

0
0

95

9

Physician’s assistant

1

Surgeons
Surgical resident

2
1

Total

222

Participate in rabies
teleconferences
21.25 Counsel healthcare workers
35.5
Discuss prophylaxis
Approve prophylaxis
Administer prophylaxis

Staff physicians
Residents

Radiology (total)
Technicians

Participate in rabies
teleconferences
106.25 Coordinate risk assessment
efforts

3

1

Pharmacy

3 physicians

Occupational 1 physician
health
3 nurses

3

EEG technician

75
5

Identification of staff at risk
Notification of service chiefs

Perform risk assessments
Counsel healthcare workers

8
15

91
5

183

Role

Notification of healthcare
workers
Perform risk assessments

Medical students
Neurology (total)

Nursing (total)
Emergency department

1
0

4 nurses

Time, h

Specific numbers of staff members are given in the indented sections under
department headings.
Abbreviations: EEG, electroencephalography; PEP, postexposure prophylaxis.
a

One trainee sought and received PEP outside our hospital despite no reported
high-risk exposure.

b

One trainee with high-risk exposure received his PEP outside of our medical
center as he traveled outside our area.

medical students, interns, residents, and subspecialty fellows.
Our own hospital staff includes approximately 2200 persons;

Total

11 staff

346

there are an estimated 250 trainees. During his 4-day stay on
the medical ward and 20-day stay in the medical intensive
care unit, our patient had interactions with many HCWs
from diverse services throughout the hospital.
As shown in Table 1, 222 persons provided care to our sentinel patient with conﬁrmed rabies, and thus were potentially
exposed to rabies. Of these, 167 HCWs were identiﬁed via documentation in the electronic medical record and 55 through
discussions during screening interviews. All 222 underwent
risk assessment using the MDHMH instrument. Of 113 persons
with potential exposure to the patient’s urine and/or kidney tissue, 95 reported such an exposure and had supplemental
screening for these exposures, although rabies was not subsequently detected in our patient’s transplanted kidney or his
urine.
Screenings were conducted in person at our medical center
by 4 infection control nurses, 2 infectious diseases section
staff physicians, and an occupational health staff physician,
who addressed all questions and concerns about personal acquisition of rabies from anxious HCWs. For HCWs not at the
medical center, telephone interviews using the MDHMH instrument with extensive counseling were conducted by the 2 infectious diseases section staff physicians. Every HCW with
high-risk exposure or the potential need for PEP was discussed
between a senior infectious diseases physician and the occupational health physician before the ﬁnal treatment decision.
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Technologists
Pathologist
Pathology residents

Infection
control

Staff

Figure 1. Time to completion of rabies risk screening for all exposed
healthcare workers.
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unvaccinated had PEP using rabies immune globulin and the
4-dose vaccine series, whereas 1 HCW who had prior vaccination required the 2-dose vaccine series. All persons reported
good tolerance of PEP with none of the adverse reactions described previously with other vaccine preparations [17, 18].
There have been no secondary cases or reports of adverse effects
from PEP to date, now >21 months after our sentinel patient’s
presentation, which is the same amount of time as our patient
presented after receiving his undiagnosed infected renal
transplant.
Table 3 provides a review of available information for general
and HCW risk assessment and provision of PEP from the literature of rabies cases from 1978 to 2013, both in the transplant
[19–27] and nontransplant [28–60; Supplementary References
61–81] settings. For nontransplant settings, if the source was
known, most exposures were related to animal bite or contact,
both in the United States and abroad. Data on persons assessed
and given PEP were sometimes combined for the personal contacts and HCWs in the transplant [19, 25] and nontransplant
[41] settings. However, numbers of total exposed persons or
total HCWs assessed and given PEP were often not stated. Several reports documented that PEP was given to persons with
high risk and to those with no high risk reported, in both the
transplant [27] and nontransplant [29, 32, 37, 41; Supplementary References 72, 73, 76–78] settings.
DISCUSSION
After conﬁrmation of rabies in our patient, our infection control, infectious diseases, and occupational health staff screened
222 HCWs at potential risk, and 9 of these persons received
PEP. Eight persons had high-risk exposures and 1 HCW without high risk sought PEP outside our hospital. Because the speciﬁc high-risk exposures included broken skin or mucosal
contact with the patient’s secretions, some of these exposures
were avoidable had HCWs practiced standard precautions
[11] when handling bodily ﬂuids or contaminated medical
equipment or had they used personal protective equipment.
Rates of PEP after hospitalized cases of rabies have varied
widely, ranging from 0% to 100% of those exposed (Table 3).
During 1980–1996, the CDC reported that after potential exposure to rabies, PEP was given to a mean of 64.6 persons per case
(SD, 40.8 persons per case) [51]. For HCWs, PEP is warranted
after speciﬁc risk exposures and not simply after routine healthcare delivery [Supplementary Reference 62]. Early rabies consideration in the differential diagnosis, proper use of personal
protective barriers with adherence to Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices guidelines during the care of the patient [50], and prompt, thorough risk assessment of exposed
persons [Supplementary Reference 76] can help to avoid providing unnecessary PEP.
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Additional help in screening was provided by outside physicians
administering the MDHMH risk assessment instrument for 3
medical students outside our hospital. Table 2 outlines the
staff roles and time expenditure in screening, counseling, PEP
administration, and coordination with local health departments
and CDC, including the education and counseling provided to
HCWs during their interviews. A total of 346 person-hours was
expended for our efforts in risk assessment, PEP provision, and
education, nearly the equivalent of 9 staff members working a
40-hour week.
As seen in Figure 1, the time course of our screening program
allowed for the prompt evaluation of HCWs, as a screening clinic was set up on Friday afternoon, within 2 hours of rabies conﬁrmation. Our response resulted in assessment and PEP of 65%
of HCWs within the ﬁrst 3 days and 95% within the ﬁrst 8 days.
Screening was completed 32 days after rabies conﬁrmation,
when a trainee notiﬁed us of his exposure.
As shown in Table 1, 9 persons received PEP, of whom 8 were
considered high risk and 1 not high risk. No HCWs sustained
any bites from our patient. The speciﬁc high-risk exposures included broken skin contact with patient’s respiratory secretions
or tears by 2 neurology trainees during their examinations; handling soiled instruments by 1 nurse with chapped hands; mucosal splashes during examination by 1 staff physician and 1
medical student; and mucosal splashes during intubation or
suctioning by 3 medical residents. None of the 95 HCWs
who received supplemental screening for urine and/or kidney
tissue exposure reported any direct contact with the patient’s
samples. Seven HCWs with high-risk exposure received PEP
at this medical center; another person with high-risk exposure
was given PEP at another hospital, where he was stationed for
an elective outside of our area. An additional person did not recall a speciﬁc high-risk exposure, but sought and received PEP
outside of our hospital. Eight HCWs who were previously

Table 3. Literature Review for Postexposure Prophylaxis and Healthcare Worker Exposure After Human Rabies

Referencea

Year of
Illness

Transplant exposure
[19]
1978

Location of Illnessb

Exposure

Time of
Diagnosis

PEP Given/All
Assessed

US (ID)

Cornea

Postmortem

93/unknown

Cornea
2 cornea

Postmortem
Postmortem

Unknown
Unknown

[20]

PEP Given/HCWs
Assessed

71/161 (44%)

[21]
[22]

1979
1981

France
Thailand

[23]

1987

India

1 cornea

Postmortem

1 cornea
2 corneas

Antemortem
Antemortem

Unknown
Unknown
1/1 (100%)

[24]

1994

Iran

[25, 26]
[27]

2004
2005

US (AL, AK, OR, TX)
Germany

Kidneys + liver
Cornea, lung, kidney, liver,
pancreas

Postmortem
Antemortem

174/917 (19%)

Unknown
128/176 (73%)

Our case

2013

US (DC)

Kidney

Antemortem

Unknown

9/222 (4%)

Nontransplant exposure
[28]
1981

15/15 (100%)

Unknown

Postmortem

102/unknown

98/unknown

1981

US (AZ)

Dog in Mexico

Antemortem

41/unknown

32/unknown

[30]
[31]

1983
1983

US (MA)
US (MI)

Dog in Nigeria
Possible bat

Antemortem
Antemortem

28/132 (21%)

26/unknown
54/254 (21%)

[33]
[34]

1984
1984

US (TX)
US (PA)

Unknown
Unknown

Antemortem
Antemortem

142/unknown
Unknown

[35]

1984

US (CA)

Dog in Guatemala

Postmortem

179/unknown

[36]
[37]

1985
1987

US (TX)
US (CA)

Unknown
Unknown

Postmortem
Postmortem

87/unknown

85/140 (61%)
75/177 (42%)

[38]

1989

US (OR)

Unknown

Postmortem

9/unknown

2/unknown

[39]
[40]

1990
1992

US (TX)
US (CA)

Bat
Dog in India

Postmortem
Antemortem

67/100 (67%)
17/unknown

14/unknown

[41]

1992

France

Possible dog in Algeria

Antemortem

143/unknown

unknown

[42]
[43]

1993
1993

US (NY)
US (TX)

Unknown
Unknown

Postmortem
Postmortem

55/unknown
58/unknown

40/unknown
55/110 (50%)

US (CA)

Dog in Mexico

Antemortem

25/unknown

20/unknown

[44]
[45]

1994
1994

US (CA)
US (FL)

Unknown
Unknown

Postmortem
Postmortem

26/unknown
Unknown

25/unknown
16/unknown

[46]

1994

US (AL)

Bat

Postmortem

99/unknown

87/unknown

US (TN)
US (TX)

Unknown
Dog

Antemortem
Antemortem

47/unknown
54/unknown

35/unknown
38/unknown

[32]

47/209 (20%)
123/unknown
Unknown

[47]

1994

US (WV)

Bat

Antemortem

48/unknown

37/unknown

[48]
[49]

1995
1995

US (WA)
US (CT)

Bat
Bat

Antemortem
Antemortem

72/unknown
83/unknown

16/unknown
46/unknown

[50]

1995

US (CA)

Bat

Antemortem

12/unknown

1/unknown

[51]

1996

US (CA)
US (FL)

Unknown
Dog

Postmortem
Antemortem

76/unknown
Unknown

72/unknown
4/unknown

[52]

1996

US (NH)

Dog in Nepal

Antemortem

Unknown

1/unknown

[53]

1996
1996

US (KY)
US (MT)

Possible bat
Possible bat

Antemortem
Antemortem

87/unknown
26/unknown

82/unknown
23/unknown

[54]

1997

US (MT)

Bat

Postmortem

60/unknown

58/unknown

[55]

1997
1997

US (WA)
US (TX)

Unknown
Bat

Postmortem
Antemortem

55/unknown
46/unknown

54/unknown
42/unknown

1997

US (NJ)

Bat

Antemortem

50/unknown

42/unknown

1998

US (VA)

Unknown

Antemortem

48/unknown

16/unknown

[56]
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US (OK)

[29]

Table 3 continued.

Referencea
[57]

Year of
Illness
2000

Location of Illnessb

Time of
Diagnosis

Exposure

PEP Given/All
Assessed

PEP Given/HCWs
Assessed

US (CA)
US (GA)

Bat
Bats

Antemortem
Postmortem

37/unknown
71/unknown

33/unknown
70/unknown

US (MN)

Bat

Postmortem

20/unknown

20/unknown

US (NY)
US (WI)

Dog in Ghana
Bats

Antemortem
Postmortem

24/unknown
27/unknown

23/unknown
18/unknown

[58]

2002

US (CA)

Bat

Antemortem

46/unknown

28/unknown

[59]
[60]

2002
2003

US (IA)
US (VA)

Unknown
Raccoon

Antemortem
Postmortem

124/unknown
8/298 (2.6%)

71/unknown
3/173 (2%)

[61]

2003

US (CA)

Bat

Antemortem

6/44 (14%)

2/40 (5%)

[62]
[63]

2004
2005

US (WI)
US (MS)

Bat
Bat

Antemortem
Postmortem

37/95 (39%)
55/unknown

5/35 (14%)
32/79 (41%)

[64]
[65]

2006
2006

US (TX)
US (IN)

Bat
Bat

Antemortem
Antemortem

Unknown
66/unknown

Unknown
28/unknown

US (CA)

Possible dog in Philippines

Antemortem

24/64 (38%)

11/51(22%)

2007
2007

Canada (Alberta)
US (MN)

Bat
Bat

Antemortem
Antemortem

19/unknown
54/538 (10%)

16/unknown
51/524 (10%)

[18]

2008

French Guiana

Unknown

Postmortem

90/160 (56%)

48/100 (48%)

[68]
[69]

2008
2008

US (CA)
US (MO)

Dog not in US
No

Postmortem
Antemortem

20/29 (69%)
5/unknown

4/9 (44%)
1/40 2.5%)

[70]

2009

US (TX)

Bat

Antemortem

1/unknown

0 (0%)

[71]
[72]

2009
2009

US (KY+IN)
US (MI)

Possible bat
Bat

Antemortem
Antemortem

18/159 (11%)
18/194 (9%)

14/147 (10%)
6/180 (3%)

[73]

2009

US (VA)

Dog in India

Antemortem

32/174 (18%)

24/70 (34%)

[74]
[75]

2010
2010

US (LA)
US (WI)

Bat in Mexico
Bats

Antemortem
Antemortem

95/204 (47%)
7/unknown

68/unknown
5/178 (2.8%)

[76]

2011

US (NJ)

Dog in Haiti

Antemortem

14/unknown

10/246 (4%)

[77]
[78]

2011
2011

US (CA)
US (NY)

Cats
Dog in Afghanistan

Antemortem
Antemortem

27/208 (13%)
29/240 (12%)

17/unknown
9/unknown

[79]

2011

Italy

Dog in India

Antemortem

1/unknown

0/unknown

[80]
[81]

2011
2012

US (SC)
UAE
Switzerland

Bats
Bat in US (CA)

Antemortem
Antemortem

22/188 (12%)
23/59 (39%)

18/unknown
15/36 (42%)

The reference, year and location of illness, transplant and nontransplant exposure, and time of rabies diagnosis are provided. The location of illness is given as the
country (state/province) where the patient had clinical manifestations of rabies. Numbers of all persons given PEP and total assessed, as well as numbers of HCWs
given PEP and total HCWs assessed, are given, as reported. PEP rates are calculated as percentages (%), if both number of those given PEP and those assessed are
given.
Abbreviations: HCW, healthcare worker; PEP, postexposure prophylaxis; UAE, United Arab Emirates; US, United States.
a

References [61–81] can be found in the Supplementary Data.

b

US states: AK, Alaska; AL, Alabama; AZ, Arizona; CA, California; CT, Connecticut; DC, District of Columbia; FL, Florida; GA, Georgia; IA, Iowa; ID, Idaho; IN, Indiana;
KY, Kentucky; LA, Louisiana; MA, Massachusetts; MI, Michigan; MN, Minnesota; MO, Missouri; MS, Mississippi; MT, Montana; NH, New Hampshire; NJ, New
Jersey; NY, New York; OK, Oklahoma; OR, Oregon; PA, Pennsylvania; SC, South Carolina; TN, Tennessee; TX, Texas; VA, Virginia; WA, Washington; WI, Wisconsin;
WV, West Virginia.

In our hospital, 4% of our screened HCWs received PEP. Our
rate was relatively low compared with provision of PEP to 44%–
100% of HCWs in previous reports describing similar settings
after transplant exposure to rabies [19–27]. As seen in the section on transplant exposures in Table 3, PEP was given to 44%
of HCWs after the ﬁrst corneal transplant exposure described in
the United States in 1978 [20] and 73% for multiple solid organ
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transplants in Germany in 2005 [27]. For settings with few exposed HCWs, PEP was given to all HCWs after rabies conﬁrmation in the transplanted corneas, such as the single surgeon who
performed both operations in India [23] and all HCWs who
were involved in Iran [24].
As shown in the section for nontransplant settings in Table 3
[28–60; Supplementary References 61–81], although PEP was

Downloaded from http://cid.oxfordjournals.org/ at GWU on January 23, 2015

2006
[66]
[67]

literature, as well as our own experience, a conservative approach seems appropriate for determining which HCWs should
receive PEP after caring for a patient with rabies.
Supplementary Data
Supplementary materials are available at Clinical Infectious Diseases online
(http://cid.oxfordjournals.org). Supplementary materials consist of data
provided by the author that are published to beneﬁt the reader. The posted
materials are not copyedited. The contents of all supplementary data are the
sole responsibility of the authors. Questions or messages regarding errors
should be addressed to the author.

Notes
Acknowledgments. The authors thank Katherine A. Feldman, DVM,
MPH, State Public Health Veterinarian at the Center for Zoonotic and Vector-borne Diseases, Prevention and Health Promotion Administration,
Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, Baltimore, Maryland,
for her assistance with our patient’s specimens for rabies detection and subsequent risk assessment.
Disclaimer. The ﬁndings and views expressed in this report are those of
the authors and do not represent the ofﬁcial position of the Department of
Veterans Affairs.
Potential conﬂicts of interest. All authors: No reported conﬂicts.
All authors have submitted the ICMJE Form for Disclosure of Potential
Conﬂicts of Interest. Conﬂicts that the editors consider relevant to the content of the manuscript have been disclosed.

References
1. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Rabies. Available at:
http://www.cdc.gov/rabies/. Accessed 14 July 2014.
2. Vora NM, Basavaraju SV, Feldman KA, et al. Raccoon rabies virus variant transmission through solid organ transplantation. JAMA 2013;
310:398–407.
3. Babes V. Traité de la Rage. Paris: Baillese et ﬁls, 1912:81–4.
4. Hattwick MAW, Gregg MB. The disease in man. In: Baer GM, ed. The
natural history of rabies. New York: Academic Press, 1975; 2:281–304.
5. Dutta JK. Rabies transmission by oral and other non-bite routes.
J Indian Med Assoc 1998; 96:359.
6. Hanlon CA, Ruppercht CE. The reemergence of rabies. In: Scheld WM,
Armstrong D, Hughes JM, eds. Emerging infections. Vol 1. Washington, DC: ASM Press, 1998:59–79.
7. Fekadu M, Endeshaw T, Alemu W, Bogale Y, Teshager T, Olson JG. Possible human-to-human transmission of rabies in Ethiopia. Ethiop Med J
1996; 34:123–7.
8. Waggoner JJ, Soda EA, Deresinski S. Rare and emerging viral infections
in transplant recipients. Clin Infect Dis 2013; 57:1182–8.
9. Srinivasan A, Burton EC, Kuehnert MJ, et al. Transmission of rabies
virus from an organ donor to four transplant recipients. N Engl J
Med 2005; 352:1103–11.
10. Maier T, Schwarting A, Mauer D, et al. Management and outcomes after
multiple corneal and solid organ transplantations from a donor infected
with rabies virus. Clin Infect Dis 2010; 50:1112–9.
11. Weber DJ, Rutala WA. Risks and prevention of nosocomial transmission of rare zoonotic diseases. Clin Infect Dis 2001; 32:446–56.
12. Helmick CG, Tauxe RV, Vernon AA. Is there a risk to contacts of patients with rabies? Rev Infect Dis 1987; 9:511–8.
13. Manning SE, Rupprecht CE, Fishbein D, et al; Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC). Human rabies prevention—United States, 2008: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices. MMWR
Recomm Rep 2008; 57(RR-3):1–28.

HCW Risk Assessment After a Rabies Case

•

CID 2015:60 (1 February)

•

347

Downloaded from http://cid.oxfordjournals.org/ at GWU on January 23, 2015

recommended for HCWs with high-risk exposures, some with
low or no risk received PEP as well [29, 32; Supplementary References 73, 76, 77]. In a report of 2 cases from California during
the same year, the provision of PEP varied greatly, with 1 HCW
receiving PEP for the patient who was diagnosed antemortem,
and 72 HCWs receiving PEP for the patient who was diagnosed
postmortem [50]. Low rates of giving PEP at 2.6% for nonHCWs and 2% for HCWs were credited to the careful risk assessments undertaken after postmortem diagnosis of rabies
from a raccoon exposure in Virginia [60]. There was a single
report of preexposure prophylaxis for 3 pathologists performing
the autopsy on a patient whose rabies was diagnosed antemortem [30].
Because rabies usually leads to neurologic complications and
fatal infection, fear of transmission among HCWs who cared
for patients with rabies may lead to excessive use of PEP [Supplementary References 82, 83] and inappropriate deviations
from PEP guidelines [Supplementary References 84, 85]. In addition, decisions for PEP provision may be subjective based on
perceived risk [Supplementary Reference 86]. Our relatively low
rate of giving PEP likely resulted from the close collaboration of
our staff with local health departments, the use of the MDHMH
tool to objectively standardize our risk assessment, and compliance with PEP guidelines by the evaluating physicians. Additionally, we addressed all concerns raised by HCWs in a timely and
objective manner, and provided extensive education regarding rabies transmission risks and the use of PEP for all involved HCWs.
This investigation allowed for rapid mobilization of staff from
infection control, infectious diseases, and occupational health,
totaling 346 person-hours from 4 physicians and 7 nurses
(Table 2). Our estimated pharmacy cost of providing PEP for 7
persons at our medical center was US$4454; 2 persons received
PEP outside this facility. A rapid and complete investigation with
specialized dedicated staff such as ours or broad provision of PEP
[27] are likely more difﬁcult in settings outside the United States
and Europe with limited personnel and resources.
In summary, after conﬁrmation of a sentinel case of acute rabies, a coordinated effort by staff from infection control, infectious diseases, and occupational health resulted in a prompt risk
assessment of all potentially exposed HCWs including trainees
rotating at our teaching hospital. Our staff evaluated and counseled 222 potentially exposed HCWs to allay their fears regarding the nosocomial risk of rabies transmission. Within the ﬁrst 3
days, 65% were evaluated, and within 8 days of our screening
program, 95% were assessed. A total of 9 (4%) HCWs received
PEP. Our relatively low rate of provision of PEP was likely due
to HCWs’ use of standard precautions during patient care and
to the extensive education and counseling regarding rabies
transmission risk to HCWs. There have been no secondary
cases now >21 months after our sentinel rabies patient. Given
the lack of human-to-human transmission of rabies from the

348

•

CID 2015:60 (1 February)

•

Kan et al

35. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Epidemiologic
notes and reports: human rabies acquired outside the United States.
MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1985; 34:235–6.
36. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Human rabies diagnosed 2 months postmortem—Texas. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly
Rep 1985; 34:700, 705–7.
37. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Human rabies—
California, 1987. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1988; 37:305–8.
38. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Human rabies—
Oregon, 1989. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1989; 38:335–7.
39. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Human rabies—
Texas, 1990. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1991; 40:132–3.
40. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Human rabies—
California, 1992. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1992; 41:461–3.
41. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Imported human
rabies—France,1992. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1992; 41:953–5.
42. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Human rabies—
New York, 1993. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1993; 42:799, 805–6.
43. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Human rabies—
Texas and California, 1993. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1994;
43:93–6.
44. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Human rabies—
California, 1994. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1994; 43:455–7.
45. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Epidemiologic
notes and reports human rabies—Miami, 1994. MMWR Morb Mortal
Wkly Rep 1994; 43:773–5.
46. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Human rabies—Alabama, Tennessee, and Texas, 1994. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep
1995; 44:269–72.
47. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Human rabies—
West Virginia, 1994. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1995; 44:86–7,
93.
48. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Human rabies—
Washington, 1995. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1995; 44:625–7.
49. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Human rabies—
Connecticut, 1995. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1996; 45:207–9.
50. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Human rabies—
California, 1995. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1996; 45:353–6.
51. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Human rabies—
Florida, 1996. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1996; 45:719–20, 727.
52. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Human rabies—
New Hampshire, 1996. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1997; 46:
267–70.
53. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Human rabies—
Kentucky and Montana, 1996. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1997;
46:397–400.
54. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Human rabies—
Montana and Washington, 1997. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep
1997; 46:770–4.
55. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Human rabies—
Texas and New Jersey, 1997. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1998;
47:1–5.
56. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Human rabies—
Virginia, 1998. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1999; 48:95–7.
57. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Human rabies—
California, Georgia, Minnesota, New York, and Wisconsin, 2000.
MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2000; 49:1111–5.
58. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Human rabies—
California, 2002. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2002; 51:686–8.
59. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Human rabies—
Iowa, 2002. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2003; 52:1102–3.
60. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). First human death
associated with raccoon rabies—Virginia, 2003. MMWR Morb Mortal
Wkly Rep 2003; 52:47–8.

Downloaded from http://cid.oxfordjournals.org/ at GWU on January 23, 2015

14. Siegel JD, Rhinehart E, Jackson M, Chiarello L; Health Care Infection
Control Practices Advisory Committee. 2007 guideline for isolation precautions: preventing transmission of infectious agents in health care settings. Am J Infect Control 2007; 35(10 suppl 2):S65–164.
15. Wacharapluesadee S, Hemachudha T. Urine samples for rabies RNA
detection in the diagnosis of rabies in humans. Clin Infect Dis 2002;
34:874–5.
16. Rupprecht CE, Briggs D, Brown CM, et al; Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC). Use of a reduced (4-dose) vaccine schedule for
postexposure prophylaxis to prevent human rabies: recommendations
of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices. MMWR Recomm Rep 2010; 59(RR-2):1–9.
17. Mattner F, Bitz F, Goedecke M, et al. Adverse effects of rabies pre- and
postexposure prophylaxis in 290 health-care-workers exposed to a rabies infected organ donor or transplant recipients. Infection 2007;
35:219–24.
18. Mahamat A, Meynard JB, Djossou F, et al. Risk of rabies transmission
and adverse effects of postexposure prophylaxis in health care workers
exposed to a fatal case of human rabies. Am J Infect Control 2012;
40:456–8.
19. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Human-to-human
transmission of rabies by a corneal transplant—Idaho. MMWR Morb
Mortal Wkly Rep 1979; 28:109–11.
20. Anderson LJ, Williams LP, Layde JB, Dixon FR, Winkler WG. Nosocomial rabies: investigation of contacts of human rabies cases associated
with a corneal transplant. Am J Public Health 1984; 74:370–2.
21. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Human-to-human
transmission of rabies by a corneal transplant—France. MMWR Morb
Mortal Wkly Rep 1980; 29:25–6.
22. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Human-to-human
transmission of rabies via corneal transplant—Thailand. MMWR Morb
Mortal Wkly Rep 1981; 30:473–4.
23. Gode GR, Bhide NK. Two rabies deaths after corneal grafts from one
donor. Lancet 1988; 2:791.
24. Javadi MA, Fayaz A, Mirdehghan SA, Ainollahi B. Transmission of rabies by corneal graft. Cornea 1996; 15:431–3.
25. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Investigation of rabies infections in organ donor and transplant recipients—Alabama, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Texas, 2004. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep
2004; 53:586–9.
26. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Update: investigation of rabies infections in organ donor and transplant recipients—
Alabama, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Texas, 2004. MMWR Morb Mortal
Wkly Rep 2004; 53:615–6.
27. Mattner F, Henke-Gendo C, Martens A, et al. Risk of rabies infection
and adverse effects of postexposure prophylaxis in healthcare workers
and other patient contacts exposed to a rabies virus-infected lung transplant recipient. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2007; 28:513–8.
28. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Human rabies—
Oklahoma. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1981; 30:343–4, 349.
29. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Human rabies acquired outside the United States from a dog bite. MMWR Morb Mortal
Wkly Rep 1981; 30:537–40.
30. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Imported human
rabies. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1983; 32:78–80, 85–6.
31. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Epidemiologic
notes and reports: human rabies—Michigan. MMWR Morb Mortal
Wkly Rep 1983; 32:159–60.
32. Remington PL, Shope P, Andrews J. Evaluation of human rabies exposure in an acute-care hospital. JAMA 1985; 254:67–9.
33. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Human rabies—
Texas. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1984; 33:469–70.
34. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Human rabies—
Pennsylvania. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1985; 34:235–6.

